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Abstract 
Estonia has one of the most energy intensive economies in the European Union. 
Its energy production has historically relied on fossil fuel, namely oil shale. The 
European Union Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy by 
2050 provides a policy framework for the member states in order to reduce the 
greenhouse gas emissions in Europe. Based on Hajer’s argumentative approach, 
this study focused on how the future of energy production is pictured in Estonia in 
relation to the long term energy and climate policies of the European Union. This 
study was based on qualitative methodology with semi-structured interviews, par-
ticipatory observations and document analysis.  
The findings revealed contrasting perceptions about the energy transition in Es-
tonia. The energy discourse in Estonia was dominated by concerns about social 
and economic development, wherein the energy transition meant modifications in 
the existing energy system. Thus, socio-economic importance perceived in the oil 
shale industry indicate that fossil fuels will remain in the future energy production. 
Consequently, the environmental impacts are considered in so far as the European 
Union greenhouse gas reduction objective prescribes to its member states. 
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Popular Summary 
This study focuses on how the future of energy production is pictured in Estonia in 
relation to the long term energy and climate policies of the European Union (EU). 
It investigates how different actors describe the energy sector and argue its future in 
relation to the EU driven low carbon energy transition. 
The European Union Low carbon economy Roadmap aims at reducing the 
greenhouse gas emissions in Europe by 80% to 95% by 2050 compared to 1990. 
Together with the Energy Roadmap the EU provides a long term vision for the 
member states in order to initiate bold investments in green technologies and 
innovation in the energy sector. 
The energy production in Estonia has historically relied on fossil fuel, namely oil 
shale. Processing of oil shale is considered environmentally damaging, contributing 
to air pollution and creating hazardous waste, as well as causing changes in the water 
regime and landscape. The most accessible and valuable oil shale deposits are found 
in the North-Eastern part of Estonia, Ida-Viru County, where the oil shale industry 
provides a significant number of jobs for the Russian-speaking population.  
However, the share of renewable energy in the final gross energy consumption in 
Estonia has been exceeding the 2020 national target of 25% since 2011. Domestic 
legislation is being developed in Estonia to enable its sale of surplus renewable 
energy to other EU member states. The Estonian Energy Strategy 2030+ establishes 
a basis for future energy policy developments in Estonia, wherein the EU market 
mechanisms are presented as the main tools for meeting the EU climate and energy 
policy objectives. 
This thesis draws on the social constructionism and the focuses on the energy 
discourse in Estonia. Hajer’s argumentative approach is employed to detect the 
story-lines and discourse-coalitions in the Estonian energy sector. For that, various 
qualitative methods were used, such as interviews, participatory observation, and 
document analysis. In this study three key themes emerged, each of which 
illuminated two opposing story-lines. First, paradoxically oil shale industry was 
perceived to ensure energy and national security as well as to pose a security threat. 
Second, some actors favoured a market led approach, while others perceived 
purposeful policy development crucial for the energy transition. The third theme 
refers to the extent to which the existing energy system needs to be changed. Here, 
some actors foresaw modifications as being sufficient while others sought for 
structural change.  
Through these story-lines it became evident, that energy discourse was dominated 
by economic and social values and concerns. Therefore, the transition pathway in 
Estonia was found to be guided towards energy system improvement by the market 
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based approach, whilst the environmental values and concerns remained secondary. 
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1 Introduction 
In the global arena, the European Union (EU) has been one of the forerunners of 
sustainable development. The EU has developed multiple strategies and policies in 
order to reduce human impact on the environment and to address the issue of climate 
change, many of them focusing especially on energy production (European 
Environmental Agency, 2013). As a result, the Energy Roadmap 2050 has been 
developed in order to provide a long term trajectory for the energy policies of the 
member states. The roadmap foresees an energy transition that encompasses a shift 
from fossil fuels to renewable energy (RE) sources and places great importance on 
improving energy efficiency in order to decarbonise the energy sector. (European 
Commission, 2011b)  
As the EU energy transition is realised by individual member states, it poses a 
variety of questions on a national level. The translation of EU and climate energy 
policy objectives into national policy has been accompanied by contested debate 
(Späth and Rohracher, 2010) due to the contextual differences and preconditions in 
the member states. A transition to RE sources embodies uncertainties and brings 
about choices which contain various trade-offs between environmental, social and 
economic development goals. 
The aim of this thesis is to investigate how the EU driven transition to a low 
carbon economy is translated in the Estonian energy sector by focusing on how 
different actors describe the energy sector and argue its future in relation to the EU 
driven low carbon energy transition. As a European Union member state, Estonia 
has to adapt the EU energy and climate policies and work together with other 
member states towards more sustainable solutions for energy generation. However, 
Estonia has one of the most energy intensive economies in EU; relying on domestic 
fossil fuels while at the same time being one of the most energy independent EU 
member states. The Estonian energy sector is historically based on domestic fossil 
fuel, namely oil shale (Tammiksaar, 2014; Valgma, n.d.). However, oil shale based 
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energy production has environmental impacts (Gavrilova et al., 2005) that are 
increasingly putting pressure on the existing energy system. In such a setting, the 
energy transition could be expected to be rather challenging. 
Thus, my interest is to understand how the future of energy production, electricity 
and heat production in particular, is pictured in Estonia in relation to the EU long 
term energy and climate policies. By using an argumentative approach to policy 
studies, the focus is on identifying the dominant storylines around the different 
energy transition pathways, and how different actors support or challenge these 
storylines.  
Through different sets of qualitative research methods, I investigate the following 
research questions:   
 How do various stakeholder groups in the Estonian energy sector describe 
the future energy supply?  
 What steps are considered to be necessary in order to meet the EU long term 
climate and energy policy objectives?  
 What are the expectations of stakeholder groups with regards to energy 
transition?  
 How are social, economic and environmental developments and values 
considered and balanced by different actors?  
This paper will first introduce Estonia and the current developments in the energy 
sector. Next, previous research on energy transition and Estonian oil shale industry 
will be presented. Following the theory and the methods the results will be described 
and discussed. In the discussion section, the findings will be further discussed and 
contextualised based on previous research. Lastly, the main conclusions are 
summarised and ideas for further research are suggested.  
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2 EU policies and Estonian Energy 
Production  
2.1 European Union strategies relevant for the Estonian 
energy transition 
The EU has committed itself and thus its member states to ambitious goals in order 
to mitigate climate change. The Europe 2020 Strategy was developed in 2010 after 
the financial crises in order to start building smart, sustainable and inclusive growth 
in Europe. The strategy calls for action in various domains, including climate and 
energy, with targets to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 20%, increase 
the share of RE to 20% and to make a 20% improvement in energy efficiency 
(European Commission, 2010). These targets are enforced by several directives, 
such as the Directive 2009/28/EC to promote RE and the Directive 2012/27/EU to 
promote energy efficiency, which transform them into binding objectives and force 
member states to take action on a national level (European Environmental Agency, 
2013). Yet, the measures for meeting the EU objectives are up to the member state 
to decide.  
Drawing on the Europe 2020 strategy, the EU has developed a Roadmap for building 
a competitive low carbon Europe by 2050 (Low carbon economy Roadmap). This 
Roadmap is a visionary document established by the EU with the aim of reducing 
its GHG emissions 80% to 95% by 2050 compared to 1990. Additionally, the 
intermediate GHG reduction targets for the pathway have been calculated to be 40% 
and 60% by 2030 and 2040, respectively. Moreover, the power sector is anticipated 
to reduce its GHG emissions from 93% to 99% by 2050 (European Commission, 
2011a). This roadmap suggests a cost-efficient emission reduction per sector with 
the underlying purpose of ensuring secure, affordable and environmentally friendly 
energy for the citizens of the EU. (European Commission, 2011a)  
A more detailed and energy-specific document, The Energy Roadmap 2050, has also 
been developed based on the Europe 2020 Strategy. The Energy Roadmap serves as 
an extension of the Low carbon economy Roadmap. The Energy Roadmap 2050, 
where electricity is given a central role in the energy system, provides member states 
with a trajectory that indicates the policy direction in the energy sector for post-2020 
action (European Commission, 2011b). It has developed various scenarios for the 
future, noting that there is a lot of uncertainty attached to it. However, all the 
scenarios foresee a gradual shift from fossil fuels to RE sources, to a different extent. 
The Energy Roadmap 2050 serves to provide a long term vision for the direction the 
EU has chosen, and to reduce uncertainty for the member states and investors in 
order to initiate bold investments in green technologies and innovation. The 
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encouragement is described as being essential, since the investments made today 
will determine the energy mix and therefore its related emissions in the coming 
decades. The Energy Roadmap places great importance on improving energy 
efficiency and on substituting fossil fuels with renewable energy sources in order to 
meet the decarbonisation target as well as to benefit from the enhanced security and 
competitiveness of the European energy system. Further, research and development 
are prioritised, as means of supporting innovation and efficiency as well as to find 
answers to the currently existing technical deficiencies, such as energy 
accumulation. Moreover, this roadmap emphasises economic competitiveness, 
provision of jobs and domestic energy security that can be achieved by promoting 
technological innovation in the transition to low carbon economy. (European 
Commission, 2011b) Yet, the interpretation and realisation of the Roadmap on a 
national level is dependent on the national setting of a particular member states, in 
this case Estonia. 
2.2 Background – Estonia  
The Republic of Estonia is the northernmost of the three Baltic States (Latvia, 
Lithuania and Estonia) in Eastern Europe. After World War II, Estonia was under 
the occupation of the Soviet Union, however, it regained its independene in 1991. 
(Estonia's history - estonia.eu) In 2004 Estonia became a member of the EU. The 
population of Estonia is approximately 1.3 million people, of which roughly 1/4 are 
ethnic Russians1  (Statistics Estonia (2), 2015)  
The capital city of Estonia is Tallinn, which has 439 500 inhabitants. Other larger 
cities are Tartu (103 000 inhab., Tartu County), Narva (65 900 inhab., Ida-Viru 
County), Kohtla-Järve (44500 inhab, Ida-Viru County) and Pärnu (44 000 inhab., 
Pärnu County) (Figure 1). The total area of Estonia covers 45 227 km2, around 50% 
of which is covered with forests that are rich in game. (Estonia at a Glance - 
estonia.eu) Furthermore, various mineral resources can be found in Estonia, of 
which peat and oil shale are particularly important in the energy context (Isakar, 
2011). 
2.2.1 Oil shale extraction 
Oil shale is a major source of electricity generation in Estonia (Statistics Estonia (1), 
2015). Oil shale is a sedimentary rock, a fossil which can be combusted to produce 
electricity and heat, as well as to extract shale oil. The latter is a liquid energy carrier, 
                                                     
1 Ethnic nationality – the data is based on self-determination. The ethnic nationality of the 
mother is taken as a basis for determining the ethnic nationality of the child. (Statistics 
Estonia (2), 2015) 
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that can be refined to diesel or gasoline (Oil shale, 2013). Thus, energy production 
is understood as production of electricity, heat and shale oil. It is relevant to include 
oil production in order to understand the dynamics of the Estonian energy sector. 
The mining, combustion, and processing of oil shale is considered to be responsible 
for environmental damage; causing air pollution and toxic waste formation, as well 
as changes in the water regime and landscape.  
Oil shale can be found in many countries, however, only in Estonia does it play a 
central role in the economy (Gavrilova et al., 2005). Oil shale has historically played 
a central role in the electricity and heat production in Estonia. The mining of oil 
shale first began in the beginning of the 20th century as a replacement for coal, as 
well as a source of energy for the power of industries in the mining areas. After the 
Second World War, the demand for oil shale increased and oil shale gained further 
importance as an input to the electricity production. The know-how and 
technologies necessary for oil shale processing, which were developed and 
improved throughout the last century mainly by Estonian engineers, are in 
increasing demand in the world (Holmberg, 2008). In recent years, the Estonian oil 
shale industry has invested in other countries, such as Jordan and the U.S. By 
exporting their knowledge and technology, Estonian oil shale companies, 
particularly Eesti Energia (EE), seek to make use of oil shale deposits that are 
located elsewhere (Courch, 2015). 
Figure 1. Map of the Estonian counties  
(source: https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:EVabariik.png) 
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However, oil shale is not only an important source in Estonian energy and heat 
production, it is currently also held responsible for the majority of Estonian GHG 
emission. In 1990, which is the reference year for the Kyoto Protocol as well as for 
the EU Low carbon economy Roadmap, the GHG emissions in Estonia were 
remarkably higher than they are today. According to the most recent Estonian 
National Inventory Report (NIR), under the United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the total GHG emissions in the country have 
decreased by 45.7% in 2013 since the base year 1990. (The Ministry of the 
Environment, 2015). Extensive reduction in emissions occurred as a result of the 
Estonian restoration of independence in 1991, and the consequent restructuring of 
the economy. Nevertheless, the energy sector in Estonia is still accountable for a 
large portion of CO2 emissions. In 2013, the energy sector alone contributed 87.6% 
of the total GHG emissions, with energy industries being accountable for 80.5% of 
the sectors’ emissions and for 71.5% of total GHG emissions. Moreover, the share 
of oil shale in the total primary energy supply has increased from 52% in 1990 to 
68% in 2013 (The Ministry of the Environment, 2015).  
The most accessible 
and valuable oil shale 
deposits are found in 
the North-Eastern part 
of Estonia. (Koel, 
1999) Therefore, the 
oil shale industry is 
located in Ida-Viru 
County (Ida-Viru 
maakord, colloquially 
Ida-Viru maakond) 
(Figure 1). Central 
electricity power 
plants near the 
deposits were 
constructed in the 
1960s-1970s 
(Gavrilova et al., 
2005). Since then oil 
shale has remained 
central in the 
electricity and heat 
production in Estonia 
(Gaškov et al., 2012). Figure 2. Oil shale (photo: Maris Neeme, Ida-Virumaa) 
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The industry provides a significant number of jobs in the county, where around 72% 
of the population is Russian by ethnic nationality, and the unemployment rate is 
twice as high as the national average (Statistics Estonia, 2016). The average gross 
wage in Ida-Virumaa has constantly been lower than the Estonian average; for 
example, in 2011 it was 16% lower as compared to the national average. (Pihor et 
al., 2013)  
These socio-economic aspects have increased the importance of the oil shale 
industry in Estonia as can be detected from various media publications and the 
public debate, where oil shale is often associated with upheld employment rates in 
Ida-Virumaa.  
It is also noteworthy that approximately 90% of the total oil shale excavated is 
mined by the state owned company EE (Gaškov et al., 2012). Nevertheless, there 
are other active private actors in the oil shale sector, who mine and process oil shale.  
About 80% of electricity is generated from oil shale (Elektri tootmine, 2015), even 
though the process has very low overall efficiency (Gavrilova et al., 2005). This is 
indicated by the energy intensity value, which is defined as the ratio between the 
gross inland consumption of energy and the gross domestic product (GDP) for a 
given calendar year (Eurostat (1), 2015). This indicator shows Estonia to be the 
second most energy intensive economy in Europe, resulting in a rate three times 
higher than the average of the EU-28 (Figure 3).   
Figure 3. The energy intensity of the economy in 2014 given in kilogram of 
oil equivalent per 1000 Euro (Eurostat (1), 2015) 
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The generation of electricity, which is to a large extent still based on the combustion 
of oil shale, has exceeded local needs, which is why electricity has become an 
important subject for export (Elering, 2014).
Additionally, shale oil production has increased remarkably since 1990. It has been 
a great export product in light of high prices on the global oil market (The Ministry 
of the Environment, 2015). Due to its domestic energy sources, Estonia is 
considered to be rather independent, having one of the lowest energy dependency 
percentages amongst the 28 EU member states (Eurostat (2), 2015).  
In the beginning of March 2016, the Estonian Government decided to temporarily 
reduce environmental taxes in order to reduce the burden on the oil shale industry. 
(Postimees, 2016b; Keskkonnaministeerium, 2016). This was explained to be 
necessary to uphold the operation of the industry in light of low global oil and 
electricity prices. The change is projected to enter into force on July 1, 2016 and 
lasts until the January 1, 2018 (Põhjarannik, 2016).  
2.2.2 Renewable energy 
Under the RE directive 2009/28/EC Estonia has committed itself to achieving 25% 
renewable energy share from the gross final energy consumption by 2020 (European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2009). However, Estonia has 
preconditions which have fostered the early achievement of the EU 2020 climate 
and energy policy objectives, as already noted in relation to the GHG emission 
reduction. In 2005, which is the reference year for the RE 2020 objective, the share 
of RE in Estonia was already 17.5% (Eurostat, 2014), meaning only an increase of 
7.5% needs to be achieved within the 15-year time frame.  
The share of RE in the final gross energy consumption of Estonia is already 
exceeding the 2020 national target of 25% since 2011. (Figure 4)  
Thus, Estonia is the first country in the EU to fulfill its 2020 RE target. (Estonian 
Windpower Association, 2016). The largest share of renewable sources was used in 
the heat sector, where RE accounted for 43% in 2013. In the electricity sector it 
accounted for 13.2% and in the transport sector 0.2% (Potisepp et al., 2015). 
The Estonian renewable energy action plan which was submitted under the EU 
Renewable Energy Directive sets sector based targets as follows: 38.4% of 
renewable energy in heat and cooling; 17.6% of RE in electricity, and 10% of RE in 
transport, with a total of 25% (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communication). 
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The renewable Energy Directive 2009/28/EC introduced Cooperation Mechanisms, 
which enables the sale of the excess RE to countries that have difficulties with 
meeting their targets (European Commission, 2016). Currently, domestic legislation 
is being developed in Estonia order to enable the surplus RE to be sold to other EU 
member states in the form of statistics2 (Postimees, 2016). 
 
2.2.3 Estonian Energy Strategy 2030+ 
The Estonian Energy Strategy 2030+ (ENMAK) establishes a basis for future 
energy policy developments in Estonia. (Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Communication, 2015) Yet, it should be noted that the document has recently been 
submitted to be approved by the Ministries and for this reason should not be 
considered final (Eesti pikaajaline energiamajanduse arengukava 2030+, 2015). 
Nevertheless, as the analysis and initial decisions about the suitable scenarios have 
been made, the strategy is used to illuminate different problem definitions associated 
with the energy transition.  
                                                     
2 In a statistical transfer, an amount of renewable energy is deducted from one country's 
progress towards its target and added to another's. This is an accounting procedure and no 
actual energy changes hands. (Cooperation mechanisms - Energy - European Commission) 
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Figure 4. The percentage of renewable energy in gross final energy consumption 
(Eurostat, 2014) 
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 ENMAK is a policy framework produced by The Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Communication, which visualises the policy developments in the energy sector until 
2030 and 2050. The document emphasises that ensuring Estonian long-term energy 
independency is the basis for the wellbeing of Estonian citizens, the competitiveness 
of Estonian entrepreneurs, and Estonian energy security. On the one hand, the 
document recognises the need of the state to interfere in order to reduce the final 
consumption of energy, as without it the energy consumption is projected to increase. 
However, on the other hand, the RE targets are left to be guided by market 
mechanisms (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communication, 2015). 
According to ENMAK, electricity generation is a great contributor to the economic 
efficiency, since besides the direct utilisation of primary energy resources, 
production residues, which have no output elsewhere will be employed for 
electricity purposes. Keeping in mind the long-term EU climate and energy politics, 
electricity production from oil shale has to shift from direct combustion to co-
production of shale oil and electricity, thereby extending the value chain, improving 
efficiency and lowering the environmental impacts.  
Electricity production must be competitive on the regional market without subsidies, 
with any subsidies only being implemented in exceptional circumstances, and only 
if absolutely needed, in order to comply with the RE targets. Similarly, in the heating 
system the political choices and measures must depart from the idea, so the system 
must be sustainable without subsidies.  
Market mechanisms such as Cooperation Mechanisms and the EU-wide Emission 
Trading System are seen as main promoters of investments. National subsidies as a 
basis for the development of new electricity capacities must be replaced by efficient 
and reliable Emission Trading System and EU-wide RE subsidy schemas. The 
strategy emphasises that primarily, due to effectively functioning ETS, and the 
implementation of the planned investments in oil shale industry, the share of 
renewable energy in the final electricity consumption is predicted to be 30% by 2030 
and the average CO2 emission from electricity production is foreseen to be reduced 
to about 4.5 million tons per year (in 2012 it was 12 million tons). The majority of 
the RE is foreseen to be sourced by biomass and wind (Ministry of Economic Affairs 
and Communication, 2015).
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3 Previous research 
3.1 Managing energy transitions 
Policy and related debates on energy transition have received a lot of scholarly 
attention in various countries due to the raising concern over climate change and 
resource use.  
The concept of ‘transition management’ as a concept has been widely employed in 
the transitions of energy systems. Kemp et al. (2005b, p. 42) have defined transition 
management as “a deliberate attempt to bring about structural change in a stepwise 
manner” to pursue sustainability that would offer environmental, social and 
economic benefits (Kemp and Loorbach, 2005). The energy transition in the 
Netherlands has found a lot of attention in recent research (Kern and Smith, 2008; 
Meadowcroft, 2009, Kemp et al., 2007) as the transition management concept was 
adopted by the government as a policy model in order to address the unsustainability 
of the existent energy system (Kern and Smith, 2008). In order to prevent the 
premature lock in of a technology, the government created a space for different 
technologies to emerge and develop. A problem found by Kern et al. (2008) is that 
stakeholders perceive such flexibility as indecisiveness and lack of commitment. 
Further, regime energy companies, i.e. incumbents, were found to be dominant in 
the energy transition (Kemp and Loorbach, 2005; Kern and Smith, 2008) that is 
likely to restrain the structural change. Although, the space for innovation was 
created in the Netherlands, Kern et al. (2008, p. 4101) point out the lack of control 
policies which are “necessary to pressure the regime and change the selection 
environment to create market pull for green innovations”. Moreover, the existing 
Dutch RE policy received criticism for being unstable, and thus reducing the 
security for investors. (Kern and Smith, 2008)  
Meadowcraft (2009) has elaborated on the transition management concept and 
suggests that in order to avoid a ‘lock-in’ effect of an existing energy system, policy 
makers should simultaneously encourage ‘system improvement’ and ‘system 
innovation’, wherein the former refers to modifications of the existing practices and 
the latter implies new experimental solutions. According to Geels (2004, p. 19), 
“system innovation can be understood as a change from one socio-technical system 
to another” that encompasses comprehensive changes in technology, evokes new 
actors and affects the existing social and institutional arrangements (Kern, 2011). 
Focusing only on system improvement may prove to be sufficient if the problem is 
rather mild or if the existing technology has higher adaptive potential than initially 
expected (Meadowcraft, 2009). Yet, Kemp et al. (2005b) argue that investing 
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primarily in ‘system improvement’ will sustain the existing system and stimulate 
the lock-in effect. Moreover, according to Kemp et al. (2007), the key problems 
found in change management are the differences in peoples’ divergent perspectives 
about the problem and the solution, distributed control among the various actors 
representing distinct understandings, the danger of getting locked in to a non-
optimal solution and the political myopia, which refers to the long timeframe before 
the results of transition become visible.  
According to Markard et al. (2016, p. 216), “transitions are characterized by 
fundamental uncertainties, which means that even the formulation of a policy 
problem is ambiguous and contested, let alone policy goals, strategies and expected 
outcomes“. Thereby, cognition and framing are particularly important in order to 
understand the aims and processes behind energy transition.  
Markard et al. (2016) argue policy change to be the key for energy transition, since 
policies may encourage energy transition but they may as well constrain it. Further, 
Markard et al. (2016) argue energy policies to be the result of politics, whereby the 
latter notion implies to a struggle between various actors who seek to legitimise their 
understandings of a problem. Markard et al. (2016) study energy policy in 
Switzerland and reveal two rather stabile discourse coalitions – a pro-ecology 
coalition that sees public policy as necessary for energy transition, and pro-economy 
coalition which supports the existing energy system with its economic benefits. 
(Markard et al., 2016). Although, the coalitions were analysed based on their belief 
system, their respective indications to the transition approach appear to be similar 
to the ones emerging from my study. 
In order to analyse the transition, Geels et al. (2007) have suggested three analytical 
levels based on a multi-level perspective: regime, landscape and niches. Herein, 
regime encompasses the current arrangement of technological solutions, practices, 
regulatory environment, and competencies (Kern and Smith, 2008). The landscape 
implies to external pressures such as climate change issue or market changes (Kern 
and Smith, 2008; Geels and Schot, 2007). If neglected by the regime actors, societal 
pressure groups draw attention and insist on solutions for the consequences resulting 
from landscape pressures (Geels and Schot, 2007). The niche level provides an arena 
for new innovations such as renewable energy technologies and actors to emerge. 
System innovation can be anticipated as a result of interaction between these three 
levels (Kern and Smith, 2008).  
Before the purposeful transition management, liberalisation and Europeanisation 
had been the main drivers for the energy policies in the Netherlands (Kern and Smith, 
2008). Raven (2004, p. 33) argues that “with the liberalisation the long-term 
planning of future power plants and securing reliability of supply is jeopardised by 
the preference for short-term return investments”. Moreover, Verbong and Geels 
(2007) suggest that liberalisation and Europeanisation, and the low profile of 
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environmental problems prevent the transition towards a sustainable electricity 
system. Contrarily, Markard and Truffer (2006) argue that liberalisation may be 
precisely the driver of innovation, which thereby weakens dominant technologies. 
Jaspal et al. (2014) studied the energy discourse in the United Kingdom by analysing 
media publications and found that the debate consist of opposing perceptions on 
shale gas and fracking. Interestingly, similar notions, such as ‘threat’, were 
commonly used to mobilise both the anti-fracking and pro-fracking actors. On one 
side, fracking was presented as posing a threat to human health and the environment, 
while on the other side, fracking was framed as a solution to the threat (Jaspal and 
Nerlich, 2014). Cotton et al. (2014) revealed the frames of fracking such as clean 
vs. dirty, transition fuel vs. diversion fuel, and contested views on procedural and 
distributive environmental injustice. Moreover, they found that shale gas fracking 
in the UK was framed using the metaphors of environmental, social and economic 
development across both pro and anti-shale gas coalitions. Yet, the government, in 
the pro-oil shale gas coalition, prioritised economic development over the potential 
environmental impacts. Negative environmental impacts are presented to be 
manageable through regulation and opposition could be managed by incentivisation 
of the local communities and authorities. Consequently, the various story-lines were 
found to have little impact on the UK shale gas policy, as the dominant story-line 
presented by the government emphasised global competitiveness, energy security 
and profitability (Cotton et al., 2014). 
3.2 Energy, ethnicity and Estonian independence 
While transition management is generally well covered in scientific literature, there 
are only a few studies which focus on the developments of the Estonian energy 
sector (Auer, 1998; Holmberg, 2009). Nevertheless, a few inter-disciplinary studies 
can be found, which are interestingly conducted by foreign researchers. Auer (1998) 
analysed the impacts of the oil shale (as well as phosphorite) industry on Estonian 
independency, and its interdependency with environmentalism. The study provides 
an understanding of the connections between the current distribution of ethnic 
nationality in Ida-Virumaa, and its relation to the oil shale industry. After World War 
II, when the oil shale industry reactivated and expanded, Estonians were reluctant 
to work for it for various reasons (environmental concerns, feeling of injustice, 
unattractive working conditions), which is why the labour workers had to be 
imported from elsewhere in the Soviet Union. Auer (1998) argues that the 
environmental concerns in Estonia posed by the oil shale industry were largely 
influenced by the ethnic and economic colonialism that at the time was strongly 
opposed by ethnic Estonians.   
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A more recent study, which provides a historical contextualisation of the oil shale 
industry in Estonia, is offered by Holmberg (2008). Holmberg (2008) reveals the 
forces that support the persistence of the oil shale industry, such as the wish to 
maintain energy independency, little competition among energy providers, lack of 
alternative sources, scale of the technology and the social conditions in Ida-Virumaa: 
“…massive build-up of power generation was perceived as fur-
ther evidence of Soviet colonialism by many Estonians. However, 
when the Soviet institutional structure collapsed, this very same 
technology not only survived, but turned out to be of the utmost 
importance in terms of security of supply for the re-established 
Estonian state.” (Holmberg, 2008, p. 300) 
The forces that may reduce the lock-in of the oil shale industry identified by 
Holmberg (2008) were changes in the knowledge base and societal attitudes, 
development of competing technologies, environmental hazards, slow technological 
progress in the oil shale industry, the settlement structure of Estonia, international 
cooperation, and the depletion of oil shale resources.  
Although Holmberg (2008) finds various factors that encourage the lock-in of oil 
shale as well as the lock-out of alternative resources, he suggests that Estonia has 
the tools to deal with the upcoming challenges in the energy sector, if there is 
political will. 
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4 Theory  
This study draws on social constructionism that rejects the idea of the objective truth. 
As the world is being continuously interpreted and redefined by people, the essence 
of a phenomenon does not reside in itself. Rather it lies with the group of people 
who have assigned a particular meaning to the phenomenon. (Patton, 2015) Social 
constructionist inquiry seeks to capture the various perspectives different people 
have about the world or a phenomenon in a particular context that have implications 
for the ‘real world’, i.e. on the materialisation of reality. The social constructionist 
approach enables to reveal the multiple realities. Herein, the perspectives on future 
energy production amongst actors in Estonian energy sector are examined, as they 
affect and shape the policy outcomes. By analysing the patterns in those different 
realities I seek to reveal whether and how those perceptions influence the 
development of energy policy.  
4.1 Discourse analysis 
In order to find the patterns in the various perceptions that become exposed through 
language, discourse analysis will be applied. The discourse analysis builds on the 
idea that “our ways of talking do not neutrally reflect our world, identities and social 
relations but, rather, play an active role in creating and changing them.“ (Jørgensen 
and Phillips, 2010, p. 1) In other words, we give meanings and shape reality by the 
specific way we express ourselves through language.  
I understand discourse as defined by Hajer (1995, p.44) as “a specific ensemble of 
ideas, concepts, and categorisations that are produced, reproduced and transformed 
in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and 
social realities”. Discourse is seen as a constitutive of the realities in environmental 
politics. Those socially constructed meanings, according to Hajer (1995), are 
directly related to the formulation of a problem and its political response. Problem 
definition provides basis for regulation and has direct consequences in its political 
action. Therefore, the focus of this study remains on the struggle over the definition 
of a problem. In the following analysis I will identify the different perceptions that 
come to affect problem definition. Since problem definition constitutes and shapes 
the consequent political response it can reveal which parts of social reality are 
included and which are excluded in the definition (Hajer, 1995). 
Hajer (1995) brings in the concept of ‘argumentative game’, where the strength of 
the argument is defined by its credibility, acceptability and trust. Credibility is 
necessary to make actors believe in the implied subject-positioning, acceptability 
makes the position attractive, and trust enables the argument to overpower the 
doubts of other actors, if confidence can be ensured in the author of the arguments.  
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According to Hajer, discourse in a given domain can be seen as hegemonic with the 
presence of ‘discourse structuration’ and ‘discourse institutionalisation’. Discourse 
structuration indicates to the necessity for the actors to apply certain concepts and 
ideas in a given domain in order to maintain or enhance their credibility. In other 
words, actors have to adapt particular terms to present their ideas in order to be 
perceived acceptable. A discourse institutionalisation occurs if those (prevailing) 
concepts and ideas are converted into actual policies (Hajer, 1995). 
4.2 Argumentative approach 
Hajers’s (1995) argumentative approach will be employed as a lens to investigate 
my empirical data. The approach suggests two concepts, story-lines and discourse-
coalitions, as tools for describing how the discursive orders are sustained and 
reconstructed.  
First, story-lines serve as “mediums through which actors try to impose their view 
of reality on others” (Hajer, 1993). The multiple physical and social phenomena are 
translated into story-lines that unite the knowledge, position the actors and create 
coalitions amongst the actors of a particular field. New story-lines stimulate the 
cognitions that as a result may change peoples’ ideas about their role, and the 
possible openings for change, i.e. new subject and structure positioning may emerge. 
Story-lines not only contribute to the construction of a problem but also affect the 
social and moral order in a specific domain as they facilitate the positioning of the 
actors. Further, through story-lines the understandings about “blame”, 
“responsibility”, and “urgency” are shaped. The cognitive commitments that are 
inherent in these story-lines enable and uphold the reproduction of the existing 
discursive order (Hajer 1995). 
Furthermore, story-lines often indicate an arbitrary fixation, since they conclude 
ongoing debates or represent an idea far from any academic belief. Yet, actors 
become attracted and attached to new ideas that introduce them to alternative ways 
for understanding and defining the physical and social phenomena that are 
manifested in the contemporary environmental conflict. The cognitive power and 
attractiveness embedded in the story-line determines the magnitude of influence a 
policy discourse will have (Hajer, 1995). 
Although the story-lines reduce the discursive complexity, it is important to 
understand what drives actors to promote a particular metaphorical conception. In 
order to withdraw from a too individualistic explanation Hajer (1995) introduces the 
idea of “discursive affinities”. He claims that the discursive power of a story-line 
depends on the discursive affinities, which means that “separate elements might 
have similar cognitive or discursive structure which suggests that they belong 
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together” (Hajer, 1995, pp. 66–67). Hajer (1995, p. 62) argues that the “regulation 
of conflict over an inter-discursive problem depends on and is determined by effects 
of certain story-lines.” Herein, story-lines are understood as narratives consisting of 
various elements from different disciplines. Combined together, the elements 
present a set of symbolic references that enable a common understanding for the 
actors. The story-lines can be seen as metaphors as an entire story-line can be re-
evoked by uttering a specific element. Argumentative discourse analysis considers 
the story-line to be powerful if it sounds right. The latter, however, depends on the 
plausibility of the argument itself, the trust expressed towards the author, the 
practice of the argument, and the compatibility between the story-line and peoples 
own discursive identity (Hajer, 1995). 
The second key concept in the argumentative approach is discourse-coalition, which 
refers to the coalitions that are formed among actors who for divergent reasons 
become attracted to the same specific story-lines. Discourse-coalitions thus share a 
view that ties them together and enables them to uphold the discursive order by 
expressing themselves in a particular context by using the same story-line. Such 
coalitions can be characterised by the array of story-lines, actors uttering the story-
lines, and practices where these discursive activities take place. Discourse-coalitions 
differ from traditional political alliances as they are formed through story-lines 
rather than pure interests. Discourse-coalitions are formed when separate practices 
become engaged and active in a political project through which common meanings 
are assigned to some aspects of reality. Contradictory utterances of an actor may 
indicate that their practices give strength to several coalitions. The use of an 
alternative storyline, even for criticising a rival is a sign of acknowledgement of 
other perspectives. This may be seen as a reproduction of the particular discourse-
coalition that is committed to the referred story-line (Hajer, 1995). 
The argumentative approach rejects the idea that perceptions and understandings are 
to be understood as a result of a belief system; rather people are seen to hold 
inconsistent value positions. The value positions, however, can be altered by new 
discourses that may encourage a change of cognitive commitments. Furthermore, 
interests cannot be taken for granted; rather they are constantly created as part of 
the interaction. The used language may reshape the existing cognitions and create 
new understanding. Thereby, individuals’ perceptions about problems, as well as 
possibilities, may be challenged by new discourses and create a space for new 
coalitions. Consequently, discourse is seen to have an essential role in delivering a 
political change (Hajer, 1995). 
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5 Methods 
In this chapter, the methods for data collection and analysis, used in this study are 
described. 
5.1 Research approaches 
This study is based on multiple qualitative research methods in order to triangulate 
and validate my findings. In particular, I apply the emergent design methods which 
develop and are shaped within and throughout the whole research process (Patton, 
2015). This means that the design implemented will only become apparent 
retrospectively, as new ideas and opportunities arise during various stages of the 
research, such as data collection, analysis and discussion. For instance, initially I 
planned to base my study on interviews only, but new opportunities emerged in the 
data collection phase.  
The methods used throughout this study are described in more detail in the following 
sections.   
5.2 Interviews 
The main part of the empirical material originates from 7 semi structured interviews, 
out of which one was more informative. The interviewees were representatives of 
the key organisations in the Estonian energy sector. The organisations and their role 
are further described below based on information publicly available on their 
websites.  
 
Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications (MKM) 
Their focus is on enhancing the competitiveness of Estonian economy by 
developing, drafting, and evaluating Estonian economic policies. As noted on their 
homepage, “the main strategic objectives of the Ministry involve governance that 
encourages entrepreneurship and innovation, an efficient and safe transport system, 
constantly developing information society and environmentally friendly energy 
supply at justified price” (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications, n.d.). 
 
Estonian Ministry of Environment (KKM) 
KKM aims to ensure a clean living environment, diverse nature and the sustainable 
use of natural resources for the current and following generations. The tasks of the 
Ministry include, but are not limited to the use, protection, keeping record of the 
natural resources, and organising the use of external tools for environmental 
protection, as well as compiling strategic documents and draft legislations (Ministry 
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of the Environment, n.d.). 
 
Nelja Energia 
Nelja Energia is a privately owned company with a mission to develop RE and the 
operate the power production in the Baltics. The name itself “nelja” means four and 
refers to the four sources of RE: wind, solar, water and biomass. However, the 
company is mainly focusing on wind, and to some extent on biomass and biogas. 
(4Energia, 2015). The majority of shares belong to a Norwegian company, Vardar 
Eurus, and the remaining shares are distributed between several Estonian investors 
(Estonian Windpower Association, 2015). 
 
Eesti Energia (EE) 
Eesti Energia was established in 1939. EE is a state owned energy company that has 
recently expanded its activities abroad. It is the most important energy company and 
the largest employer in Estonia. Approximately 6000 people working in the 
company, 72% of which in Ida-Viru County. As the company mainly focuses on oil 
shale, the technical expertise of EE is considered unique in the world. The aim of 
the company is to produce electricity from various sources, thereby reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. Therefore, renewable energy sources such as wind, water 
and biomass are employed. 
However, the oil shale based Narva power plants provide 90% of the Estonian 
electricity and supply the whole Narva town with heat. Narva power plants are the 
world’s largest power stations running on oil shale. The new Auvere power plant, 
which is using the most advanced technology enables up to 50% of the oil shale to 
be replaced with environmentally friendly biomass (Eesti Energia, n.d.). 
 
Association of Estonian Mineral Resources (EMÜ) 
EMÜ is a non-governmental organisation that functions on a voluntary basis. It was 
established by seven civil society organisations to offset the debate around the 
utilisation of mineral resources, which is mainly lead by business interests. The 
funding for the organisation comes from donations and project grants (Eesti 
Maavarade Ühing, n.d.). 
 
Estonian Fund for Nature (ELF) 
ELF is an environmental non-governmental organisation that was established in 
1991 in cooperation with the World Wildlife Fund and has been actively involved 
in many projects concerning nature conservation and biodiversity in Estonia. 
Currently, the organisation focuses on conservation as well as on sustainable 
development and nature education. The financial resources come from paid 
conservation work, donations, and projects’ grants (Eestimaa Looduse Fond, n.d.). 
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The interviews were held in Estonian, recorded and then fully transcribed. A concise 
summary of the interviews can be found in the Appendix. Each one of the interviews 
lasted from half an hour to an hour and a half, depending on the interviewee. In 
order to maintain the anonymity of the people interviewed, I refer to them as “s/he” 
or the “interviewee”.  
While preparing the research, I held a pilot-interview with a person working in a 
non-governmental organisation that brings together all organisations related to RE 
production. The interview lasted for an hour and the interviewee shared what s/he 
perceives as problematic at the moment in the Estonian energy sector and what the 
ongoing relevant debates are about. I also received a list of people and organisations 
that could be relevant for my topic.  
As for the sampling method, I combined snowball sampling, maximum variation 
sampling and the selection of key informants. (Patton, 2015) First, the snowball 
method implied that all the interviewees were asked about other relevant actors. The 
first actors were named by the pilot interviewee and it should be noted that many of 
them become part of my research as the same organisations got mentioned during 
the following interviews. Nevertheless, I was not able to interview all the actors that 
were suggested by the interviewees. Secondly, the maximum variation sampling 
was applied in order to enhance representativeness. That was done by the 
involvement of all the divergent and potentially conflicting opinions that I was able 
to detect. As it is the matter of similar and different patterns, I seek to investigate 
the various perspectives represented by multiple organisations. The third method of 
the key informants, i.e. people who have deep knowledge about the topic, was used 
to strengthen the validity of my results. The selection of key informants became 
especially important as the interviewees started to suggest that I meet people who 
share their understanding of the problem. In order to reduce bias that started to arise 
due to the diverging interests of the participants, I chose the representatives from 
each organisation based to their job position in that organisation. The position had 
to be (or at least appear) influential in designing the organisations’ opinion about 
energy issue.  
The interviews were planned to be held as semi-structured interviews. Themes such 
as the practice of the organisation, energy sources and low carbon economy, and 
underlying sub-themes were designed to cover the topics pre-defined as important. 
However, as I started off, I realised that following the sub-themes that I had prepared 
were limiting me to certain questions and disabling me from building upon the 
matters emphasised by the interviewee. For that reason, rather than firmly adhering 
to them, I adapted to the conversation and started asking questions that emerged 
from the different roles and concerns that the particular interviewee was holding. 
Thus, the following interviews built on the previous ones and were adapted based 
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on the concerns of the interviewees. I did remain within the general themes I had 
planned to cover; however, the questions became context-specific depending on 
what was being said. Moreover, I felt that by letting go of the question-structure but 
keeping the conversation within the matter in hand, the interviewees opened up to 
me and were able to illuminate their concerns and values with what they said. 
Consequently, it became a combination of informal conversational and semi-
structured interview that guided me through the interviews while leaving the 
conversation flexible and reflexive. (Patton, 2015) 
5.3 Additional sources 
In addition to the interviews, I got an opportunity to observe a meeting of the 
Environmental Committee of the Parliament where the national oil shale 
development plan that is about to be adopted, was being discussed. I was invited to 
attend by the interviewee of the Association of Estonian Mineral Resources (EMÜ), 
who I had interviewed as part of my research. In the Committee meeting I was 
observing as an intern of EMÜ, while the chairman of EMÜ had been invited to 
express his opinion about the oil shale development plan. The meeting lasted around 
45 minutes and I was able to take notes about what the main topics of discussion 
were as well as what contradictions arose. However, at the meeting no final 
decisions were presented.  
Furthermore, I was invited to join a 4-day trip to Ida-Virumaa to see various oil-
shale related activities, facilities and the magnitude of environmental impacts of the 
oil shale industry, such as waste. The chairman of EMÜ found it important that I see 
the actual magnitude of the impact that oil shale has on the area, in terms of social 
as well as environmental consequences. I participated as a member of an 
investigative team, where three of the members were visiting to document the 
human-nature interaction for a photo exhibition in Venice. The chairman of EMÜ 
was the tour guide and I was participating as a student doing research. During the 
trip we visited many closed as well as active oil shale mines, and looked around the 
electricity power plant and a shale oil production site. Furthermore, we passed 
through small towns that were built for oil shale industry workers but with the 
closing of the mines have become empty. My material gathered during the trip stems 
from visual sensing of the surroundings, discussions held with other participants and 
photographs taken of the facilities and spaces that had come into existence as a result 
of the oil shale industry.  
In addition to the interviews, participation at the meeting and the trip, I studied 
national media reporting, from newspapers and talk shows, which have also fed into 
my analysis of the Estonian energy discourse. The public media channels serve as a 
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forum for the debate, where the perspectives are negotiated. This makes it relevant 
to acknowledge public media channels as an additional source of information. It will 
complement my understanding about the various story-lines embedded in the energy 
debate in Estonia.  
5.4 Analytical procedure 
Data analysis in qualitative research is according to Patton (2015) like playing a 
game without explicit rules, but rather drawing a set for the game during the game. 
The handling of raw data means distinguishing the significant from the trivial and 
finding patterns to communicate. Even more, the idea is to process a large quantity 
of data to the essence of it. No step-by-step instructions exist for analysing, however 
guidelines are there to help an inquirer find its way. (Patton, 2015). 
The grounded-theory approach, as described by Bernard (2006), is a toolkit for 
identifying the concepts that surface from the transcribed interviews and linking 
them into the formal theories. To a large extent the codes are given openly, without 
any particular theoretical pre-understandings in mind (Bernard, 2006). I used this 
approach to find patterns in my data. 
First, all the interviews were transcribed, except for the pilot interview, as the latter 
was used in the preparatory stage of the research and provided a starting point for 
the subsequent study. The transcribing process enabled me to absorb the data again 
and spot some initially irrelevant-sounding utterances that revealed to be very 
valuable. I also made some notes during the transcribing process to note the 
emphasis in the interviewee’s voice or to make notes about my own thoughts that 
emerged about what was being said.  
Secondly, I started looking for potential analytical themes by coding. For that the 
meaning of each seemingly important utterance was given a code. Those codes were 
then re-organised and formed into categories. While doing that, I worked back and 
forth between the raw data and the codes, in order to make sure to consider the 
context of the utterance while categorising them. 
In the third stage, I started to compare the perceptions of the actors within the 
different categories. I juxtaposed them against one another to illuminate the 
similarities and differences within the categories as well as how these perceptions 
relate and intersect. Herein, the story-lines and the discourse-coalitions started to 
emerge. 
Finally, the focus was on how different perceptions affect the political response, 
what sort of story-lines and discourse-coalitions are present and how they struggle 
over the problem definition. 
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5.5 Limitations  
As a researcher I am a part of the constructive process of building the understanding 
and illuminating connections. Thus, it is relevant to keep in mind that I have 
contributed with my personal perceptions and understandings, which enabled and 
limited me throughout the whole research process, from the development of the 
interview guide to the interpretative process of coming to understand particular 
patterns in a particular way. My understandings provide me with particular way of 
seeing things. This may be seen as a limitation in a sense that another researcher 
may not come to find the same patterns due to his or her different way of seeing 
things. For example, I value the environment and have become cognitively 
committed to any pro-environmental ideas, which suggests a particular pre-setting 
for defining and/or categorising the utterances, actors, and social order. However, I 
have tried to overcome that limitation by being transparent and clear about why and 
how have I come to my results and conclusions. Moreover, the consciousness about 
my own personal point of view has made me very careful during my analysis. Thus, 
I have focused on really getting the grasp of the “opposing” understanding by 
“stepping into their shoes”.  
Although I strived for representativeness while choosing the interviewees, a larger 
range of actors would have given a stronger foundation for drawing conclusions 
applicable for the whole sector. Further, as there is a large range of actors relevant 
to the Estonian energy sector, the involvement of representatives of private oil shale 
companies and small scale RE companies, academics, representatives of 
municipalities etc. could have provided a stronger basis for the conclusions. 
However, considering the given timeframe as well as my previous experience in 
conducting bulky qualitative research, it would not have been feasible. 
Furthermore, the trip to Ida-Virumaa has affected my previous understanding about 
the county and the oil shale industry. Previously, I had perceived the oil shale 
industry to be a corner stone of the county, i.e. something the county’s wellbeing is 
depending on, whereas now I rather see it as a reason for the poor conditions of the 
region. Abandoned villages, and towns covered with dust due to some mining 
related factories become the prevailing picture. And I must admit that it looked 
rather miserable. The interviewee of EMÜ as a tour guide took us to the places, s/he 
considered the most important in relation to the oil shale activities and these 
potentially were the most extreme sites. It is likely that there are places less 
miserable in the area; however, those areas potentially are also more distant to the 
oil shale mining and processing activities. Thus, as my personal construction of 
reality is likely to be biased by what I learnt during the field trip to Ida-Virumaa, I 
have forced myself to constantly question and critically examine my results. Yet, 
this has led to stress and a fear of under- or overestimating parts of my data. In order 
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to cope with this, I have continuously gone back and forth between my findings and 
my data. Moreover, I have looked for additional sources of information, such as 
media reporting or personal communications, in order to verify the validity of my 
interpretation. On the bright side, the risk of being biased has also increased my 
interest to really come to understand all the perspectives within this domain. 
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6 Struggle over the future of the Estonian 
Energy Sector 
In this section the results of my analysis are presented in order to shed light on the 
perceptions that occur and prevail in the Estonian energy sector. My findings are 
categorised as sections of themes that reveal the presented story-lines.  
The analysis of the empirical material shows that the different actors have divergent 
perceptions about the oil shale industry, renewable energy, the EU climate and 
energy policy, and their own role in the Estonian energy transition. As will be shown, 
some of the perceptions reveal contradictory stories about the same phenomenon. I 
contrast the differences and similarities found among actors’ understandings and 
seek to expose the problem definition embedded in their presented story-lines. 
Story-lines unfold through the statements of the interviewees and reveal discourse 
coalitions as the actors present similar perceptions about the various phenomena. 
6.1 Social importance of the oil shale industry in Ida-
Virumaa: security or threat 
Previous studies have shown that the Estonian energy discourse is largely affected 
by social concerns over Ida-Virumaa (Holmberg, 2008; Auer, 1998). Thus, it comes 
as no surprise that one of the key themes is the social importance of the oil shale 
industry, which is further related to national security.  
Herein, the social importance is meant in relation to the employment and well-being 
in a particularly susceptible part of Estonia – Ida-Virumaa. Media reports reveal that 
a lot of jobs are related to the oil shale sector which in itself has a strong regional 
indication to Ida-Virumaa (Õhtuleht, 2014; Koorits, 2014). 
Another issue that appears in the media reporting is the complex Estonian-Russian 
diplomatic relationship, which suggests that the sudden unemployment of the 
Russian-speaking population in Ida-Virumaa poses a security threat to Estonian 
sovereignty (Lakson, 2015). Herein, national energy production and security 
become intimately linked to national sovereignty and social security. To make an 
example, loss in the social security of Ida-Virumaa is seen to initiate protests and 
draw international, potentially Russian attention, which poses risks to national 
security. A reduction in energy security would equally diminish national and social 
security. Thus, energy security, national sovereignty and social security are central 
components of the Estonian energy discourse. 
The social importance of the oil shale industry was a reoccurring theme also 
throughout the interviews. Four out of the six interviewees brought up the social 
importance in the context of energy production and oil shale industry. Two distinct 
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understandings about the social importance were presented that indicate two 
different trajectories for the energy transition. However, both indicated trajectories 
are perceived sufficient for meeting the EU climate and energy objectives. The 
difference of the trajectories rather remains in the distinct presentation of the social 
concerns over Ida-Virumaa that illuminates contrasting problem definitions.  
The social importance of the oil shale industry in Ida-Virumaa becomes a central 
part of the story-lines around distinct pathways for the energy transition. Firstly, the 
oil shale industry is presented indispensable due to the employment it provides in 
Ida-Virumaa through processes of mining and processing of the oil shale. Thus, high 
importance is placed on the industry and its capability to operate in Ida-Virumaa. 
This common understanding is expressed by the interviewees of KKM and Nelja 
Energia.  
Similar understandings are reflected in recent governmental initiatives, such as the 
decision of the Estonian Government to ease the burden on the oil shale industry by 
temporarily reducing environmental taxes on oil shale. The decision aims to avoid 
the social catastrophe in Ida-Virumaa that is projected to happen as a result of the 
shutdown of the oil shale industry. As no alternative solution is perceived to exist, 
the interviewee of KKM explains:  
“… it is done based on very clearly understandable political deci-
sions. Let’s be honest, none of us wants to see a massive crisis 
happening in Ida-Virumaa, right. Well, that is clearly a support-
ive measure.” 
[“see on väga selgelt tehtud väga arusaadavatest poliitilistest 
otsustest lähtuvalt. Noh tegelikult, olgem ausad, ega keegi meist 
ei taha näha, et seal Ida-Virumaal mingi suur kriis tuleb, onju. 
Noh, et see on väga selgelt toetav”] 
A similar perception of social importance of the oil shale industry was presented by 
the interviewee of Nelja Energia: 
“… well, I say, the social aspect is so huge there that it would 
cause a social catastrophe if we shut down the oil shale in Ida-
Virumaa.” 
[“noh, ma ütlen, sotsiaalne külg on nii suur seal taga tegelikult, 
et tekitab lausa sotsiaalse katastroofi kui Ida-Virumaal nüüd 
sulgeda põlevkivi pool”] 
Namely, the interviewee of Nelja Energia claims that oil shale companies (Eesti 
Energia in particular) simply cannot switch to renewable energy sources because of 
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the social responsibility they bear, since renewable energy would not create even 
closely as many jobs. It becomes clear that this way of seeing indicates to the ‘either 
or’ choice between environmental and social benefits. Herein, the trade-off assigns 
more weight to the socio-economic argumentation.  
Holmberg (2008) has argued that the shutdown of the industry and the consequent 
rise of unemployment among the marginalised Russian-speaking population in Ida-
Virumaa is likely to draw unwanted international attention on Estonia and cause 
accusations of discrimination towards the Russian minority. Perceiving the oil shale 
industry as fundamental for the employment in Ida-Virumaa through the national 
security frame, is continuously reconstructing the need for oil shale mining and 
processing. Thus, the fear of international reaction helps to maintain the industry 
(Holmberg, 2008), and to encourage to look for modifications of the existing 
technologies, in order to simultaneously cope with the social and environmental 
concerns. 
Interestingly, the interviewee of MKM as well as the interviewee  from EE does not 
bring up the importance of the oil shale industry in providing jobs or influencing the 
well-being of Ida-Virumaa. The words “social responsibility”, “Ida-Virumaa” or any 
other signs to the particular theme were not brought up in either of the interviews. 
Nevertheless, the future pathway for energy production, as advocated by the 
interviewees from MKM and EE, indicates to the social importance of oil shale 
industry in Ida-Virumaa. Both of the interviewees speak in favour of the increased 
share of biomass, i.e. timber and other forest products, for energy generation in Ida-
Virumaa. Such presentation, however, can be seen as an alternative solution for the 
employment situation in Ida-Virumaa, whereby jobs would be created in the forest 
sector. Partially substituting oil shale with biomass is presented as a win-win 
solution to Ida-Virumaa also by the media due to the job creation in the forest sector 
(Õepa, 2016). Yet, environmental organisations have strongly criticised the proposal 
as risking the sustainability of Estonian forests. 
Thus, it appears that the interviewees of KKM, MKM, EE, and Nelja Energia 
cognitively share the understanding about the oil shale industry as being essential 
for Ida-Virumaa and national security.  
Second, the interviewees of EMÜ and ELF (ENGOs) perceive the well-being of 
Ida-Virumaa as a reason for phasing out the oil shale industry. The interviewee of 
EMÜ presents crises as a consequence of placing oil shale industry central for the 
employment of Ida-Virumaa:  
“… well, for example, the socio-economic problems presently oc-
curring in Ida-Virumaa... they can only become sharper. In terms 
of businesss, things are becoming more complicated, similarly in 
terms on environment, because… all or let’s say the majority of 
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the oil shale that is easily accessible and that has a high energy 
content per square meter… the majority of that oil shale has al-
ready been extracted.” 
[“noh, näiteks need sotsiaal-majanduslikud probleemid, mis on 
täna näiteks Ida-Virumaal, need saavad minna ainult teravamaks, 
ärilises mõttes läheb asi keerulisemaks, keskkonna mõttes sama-
moodi, sest kõik või no ütleme enamus sellest põlevkivist, mis on 
lihtsasti kättesaadav ja mille energiasisaldus on suurt niiöelda 
ruutmeetri kohta, enamus sellest kivist on tegelt täna juba välja 
võetud”.] 
It is presented as necessary that oil shale gets decoupled from both the energy system 
and from Ida-Virumaa in order to increase national and energy security, which 
currently rely on volatile oil and electricity prices. Such concerns were expressed 
by the environmental organisations during the meeting of the Environmental 
Committee of the Parliament, as they highlighted that the content of the discussed 
Estonian Oil Shale Strategy is outdated in light of changed base-conditions such as 
global oil prices or the Paris agreement.  
So, it appears that the reliance on the oil shale industry is presented to pose a security 
threat. As long as oil shale is central for Ida-Virumaa and the Estonian energy system 
economy, national security remains at risk, because the electricity market and global 
oil prices that keep the industry going, are volatile and beyond control.  
Thus, Ida-Virumaa is unequivocally perceived to be dependent on oil shale based 
energy production, whereas such dependency paradoxically is presented to both 
pose a security threat and ensure national security. Such presentation divides the  
actors into two different discourse-coalitions that indicate to two different story-
lines in relation to the energy transition pathway (see figure below). 
Figure 5. Simplified drawing of the perceptions on the social importance that 
suggests specific energy transition pathways for Estonia (own production, 2016) 
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The interviewees of KKM, MKM and EE share a common view about the 
importance of the oil shale industry for the people of Ida-Virumaa and for national 
security. This story-line refers to the necessity of the oil shale industry for Ida-
Virumaa and bounds the actors into a pro-oil shale discourse-coalition (Hajer, 1995). 
Contrarily, the interviewees of ENGOs consider the social importance of the oil 
shale industry to pose as a threat to national security. Thus, their presented story-
line, which implies a shift away from oil shale, use in either electricity, heat, or shale 
oil production, ties the ENGOs into an anti-oil shale discourse coalition. Similar 
counter-representations are revealed from a study on shale gas, as the security and 
threat also become apparent in the energy discourse in the UK (Jaspal and Nerlich, 
2014).  
The interviewee of Nelja Energia, however, has adopted and employs a story-line 
that sounds right for him/her personally without aiming to impose it on others. S/he 
does not promote a particular way of seeing, rather s/he gives sense to the 
persistence of oil shale in the energy system. Yet by doing so, s/he upholds the 
discursive order and reproduces the pro-oil shale discourse-coalition.  
The opposing perceptions about the essence of the social importance of the oil shale 
industry imply radically different pathways for energy transition. Such dualism will 
continue to be present also in the following themes. 
6.2 Market based approach vs. public policy  
The second key theme encompasses the description of a favourable approach 
towards the energy transition. The words “market” and “competitiveness” occur 
rather often in the interviews, thereby indicating the importance of economic 
development in the energy sector. In presenting the favoured transition pathway the 
description of a liberal EU-wide market is contrasted with national energy policy 
developments.  
According to the interviewee of MKM, Estonia is a liberal market economy, where 
the policy choices are shaped by supply-demand dynamics. As minimum state 
intervention is presented as being wise, the subsidies to promote RE are seen as 
unsustainable. That is stated by the interviewee of MKM: 
“I think that this kind of environment, where each member state 
sets its own targets and then goes all the way to meet these objec-
tives and pays out subsidies for those purposes... In my opinion, 
this is not a sustainable model for EU.”  
[“Mulle tundub, et nagu selline keskkond, kus iga liikmesriik seab 
endale mingisugused eemärgid ja hakkab neid palehigis täitma ja 
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selleks maksab nagu toetusi.. et ma arvan, et see ei ole nagu jä-
tkusuutlik mudel Euroopa liidu jaoks.”] 
Thus market based solutions are presented as sustainable while subsidising is 
perceived unsustainable. The interviewees of MKM and KKM suggest that EU 
climate and energy policy objectives, also including those in Estonia, can and must 
be achieved through an EU-wide market driven mechanism, the EU Emission 
Trading System3 (ETS). Although, the current CO2 price is acknowledged to be too 
low to facilitate the EU-wide emission reduction, the interviewees of KKM and 
MKM remain rather consistent that ETS must be the common measure for the 
common goal, i.e. for EU-wide GHG emission reduction, which is seen as the main 
aim of EU energy and climate policies. The EU is thus perceived as being 
responsible for establishing the functionality of the ETS if it sought to meet its goals. 
The confidence of the interviewees of MKM and KKM in ETS is possibly affected 
by two factors. Firstly, Estonia has overachieved its GHG emission reduction and 
RE objectives. Secondly, further effort on a national level also remains questionable 
due to the uncertainty in relation to the EU policies after the year 2020. These factors 
indicate no urgency for structural changes, as Estonia is not in any hurry to further 
reduce its emissions. With a given timeframe, the ETS would be intensified, if the 
EU was serious about its long term objectives. 
Moreover, the confidence in ETS is illustrated in the ENMAK where it has been 
given a rather important role. The interviewee of KKM states: 
“We see definitely that climate politics on the EU-level should be 
based on a common view and the ETS should be the main tool 
that affects it. So based on all the predictions… ETS price projec-
tion, development plans of the [oil shale] industry itself... well, I 
personally do not see any insurmountable issues in achieving the 
-80%.” 
[“meie näeme kindlasti, et kliimapoliitika peaks olema sellise 
ühise vaatega Euroopa tasandil ja siis see ETS peaks olema nagu 
peamine tööriist, mis seda nagu mõjutab. Et noh et lähtudes 
kõikidest prognoosides.. ETSi hinnaprognoosidest, tööstuse enda 
arenguprognoosidest, meie nagu praegu, noh, mina isiklikult ei 
näe nagu mingit ületamatut probleemi selle -80% saavutam-
ises.”] 
It appears that the EU objective of reducing the GHG emissions is perceived to pose 
                                                     
3 ETS is an auctioning system for emission allowances in the EU and is emphasised as 
important measure for energy sector in the transition to low-carbon economy. (European 
Commission, 2016) 
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no challenge. Thus, market-led approach is promoted not only as sustainable but 
also as a reasonable way to facilitate the energy transition. As the current 
achievements of Estonia are in line with the EU objectives, there is no pressure to 
enforce large changes neither in the existing political nor technological system. The 
flexibility left by the market based approach enables the state to intervene if it is 
necessary to fulfil the EU obligations. Thus, the future RE and GHG reduction 
targets are expected to be achieved through market based solutions on the EU level. 
Yet, researchers such as Verbong and Geels (2007) consider energy transition 
unlikely under the conditions of liberalisation and Europeanisation, especially with 
the low profile of environmental concerns. Contrarily, Markard and Truffer (2006) 
see liberalisation as a driver for innovation.  
Further, the market approach enables Estonia to continue the utilisation of oil shale, 
thereby letting the state profit and gain return from the large investments recently 
made in EE electricity production. The wish to exploit the existing infrastructure 
and know-how is also indicated by the interviewee of EE: 
“And to some extent we are looking at the present day, /…/ what 
kind of production basis we already have. How, then, first of all, 
to make maximum use of the existing resource base and fit it then 
into the picture“  
[“Ja no mingil määral me vaatame ju tänast päeva, milline toot-
misbaas meil on, milline see ressursibaas meil täna olemas on. 
Kuidas siis kõigepealt siis seda ressursibaasi maksimaalselt ära 
kasutades sinna pilti muganduda.”] 
Expectations that the investment would pay off constitute a strong incentive for the 
state, as the owner, to sustain oil shale (energy production capacities) instead of 
choosing the alternatives. However, the technological modification that the oil shale 
industry is anticipated to go through in order to fit the market can be seen to further 
deepen the lock-in of the oil-shale based technologies. Lock-in means that a current 
technological direction (or pathway) becomes more persistent and difficult to be 
altered by alternatives (Holmberg, 2008). Thus, the market based approach can be 
seen to continuously sustain the existing energy system, which consequently forms 
a major limitation for radical changes in the energy system.  
The ENGOs, however, seek structural changes in the energy system achieved 
through policy making, which is seen to require strategic political intervention. 
According to the interviewee of ELF: 
“/…/I think that energy sector needs structural changes in order 
to not to depend on fossil fuels. And coming up with such JOKK-
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schemas 4does not help to facilitate that structural change, rather 
it keeps us in the old system as long as possible.” 
[“mulle tundub, et energia sektor vajab struktuurseid muutusi 
selle jaoks, et mitte sõltuda fossiilsetest kütustest. Siis selliste 
JOKK skeemide väljamõtlemine ei aita nagu seda struktuurset 
muutust läbi viia vaid hoiab veel meid selles vanas süsteemis nii 
kaua kui võimalik”] 
The interviewees of EMÜ and ELF criticise the market based approach and the 
JOKK-schemas as those are seen to be “picking the lowest fruits”. Such a ‘no-
vision-approach’ is seen to put the energy sector in a very bad position at some point 
in the not so distant future. Similarly, Kern et al. (2008) found that some actors in 
the Netherlands perceived the indecisive liberal approach to be reducing the 
reliability of the Government as a partner. Yet, the flexibility left by the government 
in the Netherlands aimed to prevent the lock-in of prematurely chosen technologies 
(Kern and Smith, 2008). However, in Estonia, the flexibility left by the government 
allows the oil shale industry to gradually adapt to the tightening external pressures. 
The latter becomes further evident from the meeting of the Environmental 
Committee of the Parliament, where the representative of KKM5 claimed that the 
current Oil Shale Strategy includes flexibility in order to respond to the demands 
based on the economic and global situation. Herein, the flexibility enables both the 
state and the oil shale sector to follow the trends and respond to pressures on an 
ongoing basis. 
Further, the ENGOs see the potential of Estonia becoming a pioneer in greening the 
economy in EU, but the market based policy approach is perceived to leave that 
potential unemployed. Lack of political will and the dominance of the industry in 
the discussions are presented as the reasons for such inadequacy. The interviewee 
of ELF states: 
“/…/ we feel that the force of the industry is so strong… that, 
even if during the Environmental Committee meeting we come to 
the stage where the parliament members say that, yeah, we un-
derstand your point of view… yet the decisions that come out of 
the parliament is something different.” 
[“me tunneme, et see tööstuse jõud on nii tugev. Et isegi kui me 
jõuame riigikogu keskkonna komisjonis mingil arutelul sinna, et 
                                                     
4 JOKK translates to „legally, all is correct“ 
5 Different person than the interviewee of KKM 
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üldiselt riigikogu liikmed ütlevad, et jah, saame teist aru, siis see 
otsus, mis sealt lõpuks tuleb on ikkagi nagu teistsugune”] 
Thereby, the ENGOs show little belief in the capability of the current political order 
to facilitate the structural change, as the industry lobbyists are seen to have greater 
impact on the decision making. Alike, the incumbent energy companies, understood 
as fully-developed companies that have technologies, competence, and 
infrastructure in place that fits the existing regulation, were found dominant in 
designing the energy transition pathway also in the Netherlands (Kemp and 
Loorbach, 2005; Kern and Smith, 2008). Kern et al. (2008, p. 4101) notes that the 
dominance of incumbent actors “risks incremental innovation rather than 
contributing to structural change“. The risk becomes visible also in the Estonian 
energy discourse, where modifications in the existing energy system are favoured 
by the governmental and oil shale industry actors rather than encouraging innovative 
technologies and RE.  
Moreover, dis-encouragements for RE developments are described by the 
interviewee of Nelja Energia, as s/he claims that the current regulative environment 
is unstable and thus limits the establishment of new power capacities. Similarly, the 
Dutch RE policy was criticised for being unstable and reducing the certainty and 
interest of investors. (Kern and Smith, 2008) Further, the demand for RE in the 
Estonian electricity market is possibly limited due to the burden of the RE subsidy 
that is placed directly on the consumers, adding an extra line of costs. The consumer 
thus bares higher costs when choosing RE compared to the electricity from non-
renewable sources. That is likely to reduce the demand for RE among cost-sensitive 
consumers. With the perceived uncertainty in domestic regulation and low demand, 
the interviewee of Nelja Energia describes how the company has set its focus on 
other EU countries: 
“Our message is that the green energy must be sold to Europe. As 
Europe today has not filled those green… those 2020 targets.” 
[“meie sõnum ongi see, et tulebki seda rohelist energiat Eu-
roopasse müüa, et Euroopal on täna need rohelise... niiöelda 
2020 eesmärgid täitmata”] 
Thus, the market based approach opens an EU-wide market where the demand is 
higher. As wind conditions are claimed to be very good in Estonia, Nelja Energia 
seeks to build further capacities in Estonia in order to sell the electricity elsewhere. 
Evidently, the market based approach provides a market for Nelja Energia services. 
The practical arrangements that would enable the functioning of the Cooperation 
Mechanism are yet to be entered into Estonian regulation. However, it is likely to 
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be finalised in the near future, as the Cooperation Mechanism has already found its 
place in the ENMAK. 
Further, the interviewee of Nelja Energia perceives a strong market advantage in the 
production of green energy, saying: 
“/…/if you cover the maintenance costs that means that the wind-
mill can operate as it is maintained, then all the money that is 
gained beyond that starts covering the investment. So… others 
have to additionally cover the fuel-component. In that sense wind-
mills have a definite advantage.” 
[“et kui tuulikul sa suudad hooldukomponendi ära katta, siis 
tähendab seda, et tuulik võib ringi käia ja ta on niiöelda hoolda-
tud. Ja igasugune raha, mis sealt edasi tuleb juba hakkab seda in-
vesteeringut katma. Et.. siiski ta noh.. kõigil teistel on.. tuleb see 
kütusekomponendi võrra koguaeg hiljem. Et sellevõrra on tuul-
ikul kindel eelis.”] 
The interviewee explains that fuel-free energy sources can enter the electricity 
market earlier, at a lower price, since the electricity market-price has to cover the 
maintenance costs only. Oil-shale-based electricity may enter later, with higher price, 
as it additionally has to cover the costs for input materials, either biomass or oil 
shale itself. Herein, the interviewee of Nelja Energia upholds the story-line of 
ENGOS that sees RE as more competitive compared to oil shale (or other fuel) based 
energy. 
Thus, two distinct story-lines can be seen to emerge through the different 
descriptions of reality. The difference between the story-lines lies in the issue 
whether the energy transition should be led by the market or by purposeful and 
systematic politics. These story-lines mobilise the actors in two separate discourse-
coalitions. The anti-oil shale discourse-coalition, i.e. the ENGOs promote the story-
line that perceives political intervention to be essential for the energy transition. 
Contrarily, the pro-oil shale discourse-coalition, i.e. the governmental and industry 
actors pursue the story-line that relies on market based solutions. The interviewee 
of Nelja Energia, again, remains aside from the discourse-coalitions, as s/he 
purposefully promotes neither of the story-lines. Yet, by adopting them s/he 
reconstructs and upholds both of the story-lines and discourse-coalitions. 
Further, the dichotomy among the actors begins to illuminate that the energy 
transition is understood quite differently by the two discourse-coalitions. 
 28 
 
6.3 RE vs. oil shale – innovation vs system improvement 
The third theme builds on the actors’ description of RE and oil shale. The 
characterisation of RE and oil shale reveal the perceived meaning of the energy 
transition among the discourse-coalitions.  
First, the pro-oil shale discourse-coalition states that in the long run a credible 
energy company must be able to compete in fair market terms. However, RE is 
perceived to continuously require financial support in order to operate. The 
description of RE as uncompetitive becomes instrumental in positioning the existing 
oil shale-based energy as more competitive and thereby also as a more credible 
source. Thus, the ‘competitiveness’ is used in order to frame oil shale-based versus 
renewable energy as the competitive versus uncompetitive, revenue versus expense. 
Those descriptions are employed to enhance the general acceptability of the two 
alternatives and to gain support for the current policy developments that have shown 
support towards oil shale industry. Presenting RE companies as depending on and 
craving for subsidies reduces the accountability of those technologies and increases 
the accountability of the existing energy system. Controversially, the interviewee of 
Nelja Energia claims instead that the oil shale sector is currently being nurtured by 
the state, although for understandable (socio-economic) reasons.  
Besides the competitiveness, technological descriptions are employed by the pro-
oil shale discourse coalition. Technological modifications to the existing energy 
system are seen as sufficient for meeting the EU energy and climate policy 
objectives. The mixing of oil shale and biomass for electricity purposes and 
reorienting the oil shale industry from electricity generation to oil production, i.e. 
the ‘system improvement’ is also referred to by the interviewee of EE: 
“We do not propose any energy revolution. Rather we talk about 
the reasonable utilisation of the lifetime of the existing units and 
improving them in order to reduce the environmental footprint”.  
[“Niiet ega sellesmõttes me mingisugust suurt energiarevo-
lutsiooni välja ei paku. Pigem me räägime täna ikkagi tehtud in-
vesteeringute eluea ära kasutamisiest võimalikult mõistlikult, 
nende täiustamisest, ikkagi selles suunas, et see keskkonna jala-
jälg oleks võimalikult väike”] 
Moreover, the future of the oil shale industry is presented as promising by the 
interviewee of KKM. S/he claims that the industry itself shows strong initiative in 
reducing its environmental footprint and therefore complying with the EU 
requirements. Reorienting from direct combustion to oil production and modifying 
existing technologies to further reduce emissions are perceived as a great effort and 
are thus appreciated and encouraged. Both of the governmental actors note that shale 
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oil export is a great measure in reducing Estonian carbon footprint, as the emissions 
are accounted for in the importing country. Thus, the ‘system improvement’ planned 
by the oil shale industry is presented not only as sufficient, but also as an opportunity 
to lengthen the value chain and provide higher economic benefits for Estonia. As a 
result, there is no need for the state to interfere in the transition to low carbon 
economy. Accordingly, the interviewee of KKM says: 
/…/ well, in order to indicatively meet the [EU] objective, we do 
not have to shut down the oil shale industry. And we don’t even 
have to show this direction, because by the end of the day, the 
market will determine… “ 
[“et noh, jõuda indikatiivselt selle eesmärgini, me ei pea põlev-
kivi tööstus kinni panema. Ja me ei pea nagu isegi andma seda 
suunda, et lõpuks turg määrab ära”] 
Paradoxically, with the recent decline in the global oil price and the low electricity 
price, the market is not allowed to determine. Instead, the state plans to implement 
nursing measures to help the oil shale industry cope with the market fall. As noted 
in the introduction, the Estonian government decided to reduce the environmental 
taxes in order to support the oil shale industry during these difficult times.  
The development pathways of the industry, however, are presented to be dependent 
on the decisions of the state according to the interviewee of EE: 
“…we hold the view that as long as Estonian government has a 
plan to utilise its resources… well, if at some point the govern-
ment says that they do not want to do it anymore, then fine, no 
reason to be stubborn and immensely hold on to it.” 
[“Et noh, me oleme ikkagi seisukohal, et niikaua kui Eesti riigil 
on plaan oma ressursse kasutada… noh kui Eesti riik ütleb mingil 
heal hetkel, et ta ei taha seda enam teha, fine, ega siis jälle jon-
nida ei ole ju mõtet, et millestki nagu tohutult kinni hoida.”] 
Herein, the company representative claims to only follow the command of its owner 
who has chosen to promote technological modifications. The focus on the ‘system 
improvement’ can be explained by the fact that the state has defined the oil shale as 
a national treasure:  
The interest of the state is the efficient and economical utilisation 
of oil shale as a national wealth. In carrying out the states’ interest 
environmental, economical, security, social and demographic 
(regional) objectives and risks have to be considered. (The 
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Ministry of the Environment, 2014) 
Based on the description of oil shale as a national wealth, the importance of oil shale 
becomes particularly persistent in the energy discourse through the practice of EE, 
as the interviewee of EE states:  
“Eesti Energia operates based on the objectives set by the owner 
that is the Estonian state. We have them in principle on written 
form. These objectives are, just as for any business, to produce 
profit for the owner, we must fully valorise Estonian natural re-
sources, specifically oil shale, but also others. Environmental 
damage should be as low as possible, and generally it should be 
reduced. And, of course, we must continuously ensure competi-
tiveness on the market.”   
[“ega Eesti Energia toimib tegelikult ikkagi lähtuvalt tema 
omaniku ehk Eesti riigi poolt talle ette pandud eesmärkidest. 
Need on nagu meil sellemõttes põhiliselt kirjalikult täiesti selgelt 
olemas. Nendeks eesmärkideks on loomulikult, nii nagu 
ettevõtlus, peame me kasumit tootma oma omanikule. Me peame 
Eesti loodusressursse, siin peetakse silmas küll põlevkivi, aga ka 
muid ressursse võimalikult maksimaalselt väärindama. Keskkon-
namõju peaks olema võimalikult minimaalne, seda üldjuhul peaks 
nagu vähendatama. Ja no loomulikult konkurentsivõime tagamine 
jätkuvalt, kogu siin turul”] 
Although, the company operates on behalf of its owner, the interviewee of EE 
presents a range of limitations and constraints that are related to a shift to alternative 
(i.e. RE) energy sources, which indicate scepticism. Due to the close relationship 
between EE and the state, the scepticism is likely not unique for the representative 
of EE. Consequently, RE becomes painted as a complicated alternative also 
concerning technology, while oil shale-based energy has proven to be a stable and 
reliable source for electricity and income. Based on the sayings of the interviewees, 
the oil shale industry appears dominant in shaping the future of the energy sector in 
Estonia.  
Moreover, the RE-supporting actors are presented to only care for subsidies by the 
interviewee of MKM, who describes the ‘interest groups’ to be showing low interest 
in substantive discussions and participating only if there is a chance to get subsidies. 
Thus, those interest groups are perceived to lack credibility also in meaningful 
discussion. Furthermore, the imbalance in decision-making is supported by the 
sayings of the interviewee of KKM. The interviewee presents much knowledge 
about the oil shale industry by describing their planned technological developments 
in great detail, whereas the concerns of the RE companies remain rather unfamiliar. 
Previous studies on energy transition have also found incumbent energy companies 
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to be dominating the energy transition, if is not deliberately balanced. (Kemp and 
Loorbach, 2005; Kern and Smith, 2008) 
Second, the view held by the anti-oil shale discourse coalition characterises RE and 
oil shale rather differently. In contrast to the pro-oil shale discourse coalition, anti-
oil shale discourse coalition considers RE as more advantageous compared to oil 
shale. RE is presented as taking over the market, since the transboundary networks 
are perceived to favour the decentralised generation of RE. The interviewee of EMÜ 
states: 
/…/electricity market, the grid connections we have with Scandi-
navia already work against the idea of burning oil shale. This 
year, connections with Lithuania and Sweden will be completed, 
in other words, soon Lithuania does not want our oil shale energy 
either. What’s more, the Lithuania-Poland connection will be es-
tablished shortly, which will further decreases the volume of Es-
tonian oil shale electricity that can fit the market.”  
[“elektrienergia turul, need ühendused, mis meil Skandinaaviaga 
on, praegu juba töötavad väga selgelt vastu sellele, et põlevkivi 
ahju ajada. Et tulevad nüüd selle aasta jooksul saab valmis Leedu 
ja Rootsi ühendus, ehk et Leedu ka ei taha enam meie põlevkivi 
energiat varsti. Saab varsti valmis Leedu ja Poola ühendus, mis 
veel vähendab nagu seda, palju Eesti põlevkivi elektrit turule ma-
hutab.”] 
This indicates to the Markard and Truffer (2006) presentation of liberalisation, 
where it is seen to stimulate innovation and weaken the existing energy companies. 
(Kern and Smith, 2008) Further, a world-wide technological shift towards RE is 
predicted to gradually phase out fossil based energy solutions. Consequently, the 
world-wide energy transition poses a threat to the current Estonian energy system. 
If changes are not planned and implemented, the major Estonian energy company, 
as well as the energy and oil shale sectors is predicted to end up in a very difficult 
situation. Thus, the anti-oil shale discourse coalition representation of the RE and 
oil shale pursues ‘system innovation’. By focusing on RE and externalising oil shale 
from the energy system, the difficulties of Estonian energy and oil shale sector could 
be prevented.  
Interestingly, oil shale based energy is described as a precondition for RE by the 
interviewee of EE:  
“If each RE company, especially wind power companies, today 
had an obligation to set up supportive capacities to cover peaks 
and gaps, I think we would not have those windmills in place to-
day.” 
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[“kui tegelikult täna peaks iga taastuvenergeetika ettevõte, eriti 
just tuule-energeetika ettevõte hakkama ise püsti panema mingeid 
kompenseerivaid võimsusi, siis ma arvan, et meil ei oleks ka neid 
tuuleparke täna”] 
With a sensed heroism in the latter saying, EE activities are presented to enable the 
operation of RE companies in Estonia. Fossil-based energy is thus seen as a pre-
condition for RE development. This further reconstructs the importance oil shale-
based electricity production, even in relation to wind power production. 
Interestingly, also the interviewee of Nelja Energia presents a similar understanding 
of RE. S/he says that presently RE is incapable of fully substituting oil shale in the 
energy system and that the demand peaks should be covered by some fossil-fuel 
based alternative, such as oil shale. The latter presentation upholds the necessity of 
the oil shale based technologies, but may easily be altered by innovative 
technological solutions, such as technologies for energy accumulation.  
Herein, the story-lines that emerged from the sayings of the interviews reveal 
contradictory positions for the RE and oil shale based energy and thus indicate 
different understandings about the energy transition. The story-line presented by the 
pro-oil shale discourse-coalition perceives ‘system improvement’ suitable for the 
energy transition, which is understood in relation to the EU GHG emission reduction 
objective. Contrarily, according to the story-line presented by the anti-oil shale 
discourse coalition, ‘system innovation’ is essential for the Estonian energy 
transition that is characterised by innovative RE technologies.
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7 Discussion 
Although, the EU climate and energy policy objectives can be described as a 
symbiosis between economic and environmental developments, it turns out to be 
challenging on a national level. The implementation of the EU climate and energy 
policies in Estonia is accompanied by contested perceptions about the future of the 
energy sector. The multiple visions that emerge from the Estonian energy discourse 
through the story-lines pursue the legitimisation of a particular pathway for the 
energy transition. Moreover, those pathways inherently contain trade-offs between 
the environmental, social, and economic development goals, as noted by Beck 
(1994).  
In the following section the story-lines that emerged from the analysis will be 
discussed in relation to the Estonian energy transition. 
7.1 Alternative pathways for the Estonian energy sector 
The argumentative discourse analysis revealed story-lines that encompass the 
descriptions on how the future energy production would look like, why energy 
transition is important and how to achieve it. As such, the story-lines reflect two 
distinct pathways for the energy transition in Estonia. I refer to them as ‘strategic 
greening’ and ‘pragmatic flexibility’.  
First, ‘strategic greening’ aspires for environmentally friendly and sustainable 
energy production, where RE sources gradually substitute the oil-shale-central 
energy system. It implies a need to turn away from extensive extraction and 
utilisation of oil shale for energy purposes, either it is electricity, heat or oil 
production. Developing an energy system that is independent from oil shale was 
seen necessary for several reasons. First, fossil fuels must be decoupled from the 
wellbeing of Ida-Virumaa in order to prevent crises in the region and maintain 
national security. Second, the oil shale based major domestic energy company, EE, 
must be encouraged to redirect to sustainable sources in order to remain competitive 
on the transboundary electricity market. And third, the oil shale sector, as a whole, 
must be redirected from electricity and oil production to more valuable (chemical) 
products in order to successfully withstand the tightening climate change and market 
pressures. Such reasoning illuminates how environmental interests are disguised by 
presentation of concerns over social and economic development.  
The ‘strategic greening’ implicitly prioritises purposeful development of domestic 
RE energy sources. Yet, it does not imply an urgent radical change, rather, it 
emphasises the managing of the energy system. Letting go of the market based 
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approach and taking control over the energy system, regional development and 
national security are seen essential for the sake of economic and social development. 
Particularly, as the shift from fossil fuels to renewable sources is perceived to be 
happening in the world. Therefore, the market based approach is perceived to 
embody uncertainties and risks for the oil shale sector, and the Estonian economy 
and sovereignty. Consequently, it becomes a matter of controlling the situation 
versus being led by external forces.  
Second, ‘pragmatic flexibility’ describes the energy transition pathway as a 
reflection of the EU requirements, according to which the current system would be 
modified. On this pathway, the oil shale industry is considered to be important 
because of the economic and social benefits it entails. First, the oil shale industry is 
seen to safeguard the well-being of Ida-Virumaa and consequently the national 
security of Estonia. Second, oil shale is characterised as a national treasure and is 
thus essential for the Estonian economy in comparison to the economic potential of 
RE. Thereby, from all the possible solutions for meeting the EU objectives, the ones 
least damaging for the oil shale sector should to be chosen. Thus, the market based 
approach is perceived to be suitable to facilitate the transition. ‘Pragmatic flexibility’ 
sees EU-wide market mechanisms as fundamental for the EU to meet its objectives, 
wherein the responsibility for the functionality of the ETS lies with the EU 
institution. On a national level no energy source should be given market advantage 
and energy transition should be shaped by market demand. In Estonia that would 
enable the existing energy system to adapt to the changes and meet the EU GHG 
emission reduction objective through system improvement. Consequently, the 
‘pragmatic flexibility’ transition pathway promotes the EU-wide market, while 
emphasising the national importance of the oil shale industry for economic and 
social reasons. Therefore, the environmental concerns and climate change would be 
considered insofar as they were required by the EU regulation. 
Thus, it appears that energy transition is interpreted in two distinct ways. On the one 
hand, energy transition implies to the contents of the Low carbon economy 
Roadmap that emphasise the encouragement of innovation and green technologies. 
On the other hand, energy transition is understood as meeting the EU low carbon 
economy numerical objective of reducing the GHG emissions by 2050. 
The story-lines have bound together two discourse-coalitions. First, KKM, MKM 
and EE were found to form the pro-oil shale discourse coalition through the 
presentation of the ‘pragmatic flexibility’ transition pathway. Second, EMÜ and 
ELF presented the story-lines jointly are called ‘strategic greening’, formingthe anti-
oil shale discourse coalition. Markard et al. (2016) found a similar dichotomy 
among the coalitions in Switzerland, where the ‘pro-economy’ coalition opposed 
the regulatory intervention and the ‘pro-ecology’ coalition sought for public policies 
that would consider environment and climate change. As in the pro-oil shale 
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discourse coalition, the pro-economy coalition included governmental and industry 
actors, while environmental organisations similar to EMÜ and ELF were found in 
the pro-ecology coalition (Markard et al., 2016). 
Besides the story-lines, the discourse-coalitions are also bound together through 
collaboration and their practices. Those practices however entail structures that both 
enable and constrain them. The close relationship between EE and the state, for 
instance, is likely to constrain the externalisation of oil shale from the energy system. 
As oil shale is perceived as an important source of income for the state, EE is 
encouraged to improve its technologies in order to make the maximum profit. The 
company advances its competence and technologies, thus further assigning 
economic importance to the oil shale, while the alternative energy sources become 
more distant and unattractive. Subsequently, a certain discursive cycle takes shape 
that further reconstructs and deepens the positioning of oil shale in relation to 
alternative energy sources. Moreover, the technological modifications conducted by 
EE to reduce the carbon footprint and increase economic efficiency additionally 
increases the lock-in of the existing energy system (Holmberg, 2008). Such 
interdependency between the state and EE can be seen giving persistence to the 
discourse coalition and their shared perceptions about the world, where oil shale is 
seen as lucrative.  
Moreover, the strong focus of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Communications (MKM) on economic development also translates into the practice 
and understanding of the Ministry of Environment (KKM). From the interview it is 
revealed that the interviewee of KKM showed a lot of support towards MKM. 
Potentially, the argumentation of MKM sounds right to the interviewee of KKM as 
the Estonian GHG and RE objectives have already been met with no substantial 
state intervention. 
The only individual actor, Nelja Energia, does not seek to legitimise any particular 
line of argumentation, but interprets, adapts, and thereby reconstructs both 
discourse-coalitions and their story-lines. As the interviewee of Nelja Energia does 
not refer to any environmental aspects, the company is driven by economic 
incentives to provide green energy for Europe. The problem of an unstable 
regulative environment in Estonia is thus compensated by the EU market. Nelja 
Energia, who dangles between the two story-lines and discourse-coalitions, also 
reconstructs the competitiveness of the RE. Such enlargements of RE technologies 
are endorsed by the anti-oil shale discourse coalition and presented as evidence in 
the rise of renewable energy. Such expansion of niche-innovation, however, may 
turn out to be crucial for the energy transition pathway, as noted by Geels et al. 
(2007). 
Thus, the energy discourse in Estonia can be considered hegemonic (Hajer, 1995). 
The first precondition, the discourse structuration, becomes evident as the anti-oil 
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shale discourse coalition frames their viewpoints through social and economic 
benefits. They have adopted the “rules” of the discursive “game” as they employ the 
prevalent terms and concepts, such as market and competitiveness, in order to 
impose their reality on others. Using more value and nature based concepts, which 
are potentially more customary to their practices would place them out of the 
“game”. Thus, the structuration of the discourse is manifested in the terms and 
concepts inherent in the story-lines presented by the dominant anti-oil shale 
discourse-coalition.  
Second, the discourse institutionalisation becomes evident as concepts such as ETS, 
competitiveness, or energy security have entered the national legislative framework 
in the form of ENMAK. Thereby, the market-based approach and the importance of 
oil shale become prevailing in the subsequent energy policies in Estonia. 
Consequently, although, the perceptions and presentations of the various 
phenomena formed rather opposing images about the future of the energy supply, 
the discourse can be seen to be dominated by the pro-oil shale discourse coalition’s 
conceptualisation of the problem and the solution. 
7.2 Implications of the Estonian energy discourse 
As argued by Hajer (1995) and noted by Markard et al., (2016) the definition of the 
policy problem in relation to energy transition is highly contested. This is supported 
by my findings where the future of the energy sector in Estonia is described quite 
differently by the actors. According to Kemp et al., (2007) the multiplicity of 
perceptions among actors is one of the key problems for change management. Yet, 
the energy policies are the result of the struggle between various actors who seek to 
legitimise their understandings of a problem. Thus, the dynamics of the discursive 
struggle have an essential role in shaping the energy transition in Estonia. In 
particular, the dominant problem definition becomes to shape the transition pathway 
in its political response. 
Cotton et al. (2014) found that in the UK the fracking discourse was dominated by 
economic considerations that overlooked environmental concerns. The various 
perceptions about fracking had little impact on the dominant story-line that was 
presented by the industry and governmental actors (Cotton et al., 2014). Based on 
my findings, it appears to be similar in Estonia. The energy discourse is currently 
dominated by the perceptions presented by the governmental and industry actors. 
As the pro-oil shale discourse coalition perceives great value in the oil shale industry 
it supports the development and adjustment of the existing energy system in order 
to cope with the landscape pressures, to borrow Geels et al. (2007) multilevel 
framework. Although, the GHG emission reduction objective is recognised as a 
 37 
 
pressure, it is not seen as an urgent problem, rather the objective can be achieved 
gradually through ‘system improvement’. Yet, the sudden fall of the global oil price 
has put great pressure on the oil shale industry and has thus made the Estonian 
Government address this pressure by relaxing fiscal regulation, in particular by the 
reduction of environmental taxes. Herein, the regulative change can be seen as a 
relaxation of the control policies that according to Kern et al. (2008, p. 4101) are 
particularly important in order to pressure regime actors and enable market 
conditions to advance green innovation. As Markard et al. (2016) argue policies may 
encourage the processes of energy transition as well as they may constrain it, the tax 
reduction in Estonia indicates to the latter. By reducing the pressure on the 
incumbent companies, market conditions for the emergence of innovative 
alternatives are simultaneously reduced. Moreover, the relaxation of landscape 
pressures comes at the expense of environmental impacts. 
Further, this regulative relaxation is mainly understood and explained in relation to 
the importance of the oil shale industry for Ida-Virumaa that in essence expands to 
as far as energy security and national sovereignty. The lack of alternative solutions 
is inscribed to the problem formulation, whereas the need to maintain the industry 
is perceived as the solution. Holmberg (2008) noted that the oil shale industry has 
become a problematic, yet tolerable necessity for Estonia. The oil shale industry is 
not only perceived as a necessity by governmental and industry actors but also by 
the representative of RE company. Thus, the importance of oil shale is constantly 
being re-constructed as essential for the Estonian economy, the social wellbeing of 
Ida-Virumaa and national security. Environmental losses that occur as a result of the 
oil shale industry are barely mentioned by the pro-oil shale discourse coalition. Even 
so, those sayings encompass a reference to the EU GHG emission reduction 
objective. 
Thus, it becomes evident that the Low carbon economy Roadmap endeavour to 
promote economic benefits through innovative RE development has been excluded 
from the dominant problem definition. Although environmental concerns are 
cognitively aspired by EMÜ and ELF, the framing of the concerns builds on the 
economic and social development goals, as the dominant concepts in the Estonian 
energy discourse. Whereas the anti-oil shale discourse coalition seeks to solve the 
problem of “how to exit the oil shale based energy (and economic) system”, the 
dominant problem definition posed by the pro-oil shale discourse coalition seems to 
originate from the quantitative objectives of the EU Low carbon economy Roadmap. 
Consequently, the dominant problem definition could be phrased as follows: “how 
to comply with EU long term objectives without limiting the competitiveness of the 
oil shale industry”. With no urgency to deal with the issue, the market based 
solutions are perceived as being suitable to guide the necessary steps towards the 
80% GHG emission reduction objective. Thus, the dominant problem formulation 
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itself prevents solutions that encourage innovation towards RE as the persistence of 
a fossil fuel is inherent in it. Thereby ‘system improvement’ is perceived to be the 
key for energy transition and the ‘system innovation’ can be left unaddressed 
(Meadowcraft, 2009). Kemp et al (2005b) have argued that focusing only on the 
improvement options that fit the existing system, will increase the lock-in effect and 
restrain innovation.  
As the dominant story-line focuses on ‘system improvement’ rather than ‘system 
innovation’, the lock-in effect of the existing energy system is reinforced. Holmberg 
(2008) argues that the lack of alternative energy sources and competition enhance 
the lock-in of the oil shale industry. Inversely, the lock-in could be reduced by 
slowing the technological progress of the oil shale industry and by developing 
competing technologies. Thus, it can be further seen that the dominant problem 
formulation does not only reject large-scale changes in the energy system but also 
deepens the lock-in of the existing system and the oil shale industry.  
Further, the dominant story-lines appear to oversee the emphasis of developing RE 
as described by the Energy Roadmap. The market based approach can be seen to 
encourage ‘system improvement’ that inherently excludes the potential of RE in the 
fossil fuel-based Estonian energy sector. Yet, in Estonia, the market based approach 
enables Nelja Energia, and potentially other RE companies, to develop and expand 
its services beyond Estonia. Although the company currently does not seek to 
substitute oil shale based electricity, it may happen in the future as Nelja Energia 
and other RE companies mature and continue to enter the market. Geels et al. (2007) 
has argued that if niche-innovation, such as Nelja Energia, evolves and grows while 
the incumbent actors, like EE, are under pressure, then niche-innovation may be 
able to break into and replace the existing regime. In this context, the EU market 
may enable RE companies to outgrow the incumbent actors. Consequently, new 
questions on national energy security may arise, if for instance, the RE technologies 
constructed in Estonia become largely owned by foreign companies.  
Although, there is a lot of uncertainty towards the future of the Estonian energy 
sector, the discursive space is largely dominated by the socio-economic values held 
by governmental and industry actors.
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8 Conclusion 
The aim of the study was to understand how the transition to low carbon economy 
is translated in the Estonian context. Based on my findings, the Estonian energy 
discourse about the future remains contested. Yet, according to the dominant story-
lines presented by the governmental and industry actors, the transition to a low 
carbon economy in Estonia is interpreted as meeting the numerical GHG reduction 
objective. As the energy discourse about the future of the Estonian energy sector is 
dominated by economic and social values, wherein oil shale holds a central position, 
the innovation towards RE technologies is discarded. Thus, the energy transition 
pathway is likely to develop along the line with system improvement, wherein the 
existing energy system would be modified to comply with the EU regulation. 
Moreover, the developments in the energy sector consider climate change mitigation 
and environmental development insofar as it is obliged by EU climate and energy 
policy objectives.  
8.1.1 Further research 
There is plenty to be studied in the future in relation to energy, politics and 
environment in Estonia. Holmberg (2009) notes that the changes in social attitudes 
could potentially erode the prevalence of the oil shale industry. As my study showed, 
the discourse was inclined towards economic and social development goals, further 
research could focus on the public opinion and attitudes towards the oil shale 
industry and Ida-Virumaa, particularly in relation to environmental impacts and 
responsibility.  
More so, focusing on the public opinion on RE could prove to be interesting for 
revealing consumer awareness and the acceptability of RE. Individual preferences 
towards RE could explain the resistance and support, and could prove to be useful 
for energy companies and decision-makers. Moreover, focusing on media 
publications that have discussed the energy production could reveal if and how the 
framing of oil shale and RE has changed over time. Furthermore, actors’ perceptions 
about the potential of various RE sources in Estonia would be a great addition to the 
present study.  
A great contribution to the discourse analysis would be to study the perceptions of 
the people living in Ida-Virumaa in order to illuminate how they sense the 
surrounding environment and the oil shale-based activities. It could be important to 
go beyond the social importance story-line and investigate how the people ‘on the 
ground’ see their world.  
From a different angle, institutional studies could contribute with an in-depth 
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understanding of how the formal and informal institutional rules further limit and 
enable the emergence of different opportunities, alternatives, and the decision 
making among actors. To pose a hypothesis, I would say that various actors and 
interest groups are formally accepted and involved but have a rather low impact on 
the decisions, possibly due to informal institutional rules.  
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Appendix 
Overview of the interviews 
Actors 
/perceptions MKM EMÜ ELF Nelja Energia KKM Eesti Energia 
Limitations 
for the 
transition to 
low carbon 
economy 
actors low interest in 
cooperation; ETS does not 
function properly 
wrong reasoning on 
political level for action; 
old academics are trapped 
in the oil shale know-how 
ineffective JOKK schemas 
to comply with the EU 
regulation; power 
imbalance between the 
actors (imbalanced 
representation of interests) 
unstable regulative 
environment 
Lack of the EU-wide 
collective action 
technological, local natural 
conditions are limiting the 
development of RE 
Perceptions 
about EU 
energy-
related 
objectives 
The EU is being altruistic; 
long term objectives are 
indicative, not obligatory; 
state only needs to reduce 
GHG emissions; ETS is 
expected to do the job; 
local measures are free of 
choice;  
in order to be successful 
we should not depart from 
the idea that the EU 
requires something 
 international attention on 
climate change helps to 
draw attention on local 
scale; the EU objectives in 
Estonia are two folded- as 
oil shale under pressure, 
plan to increase timber 
utilisation as biomass 
 create market for 4Energy 
services in Europe; 
Uncertainty in relation to 
post-2020, 
the main aim is 80% 
reduction of CO2 in 
national level; ETS is seen 
as the main instrument that 
should enable this 
carbon neutral means 
biomass to be combusted; 
objectives are translated 
into national policies that 
then are being followed by 
EE 
Perception of 
own role in 
shaping the 
energy sector 
create good conditions for 
free market economy in 
Estonia, without the state 
intervention; increase 
welfare through enhanced 
competitiveness 
keep eye on oil shale 
industry; speak to the 
politicians and citizens 
tries to contribute to 
political change via public 
opinion; organise actions to 
draw public attention; 
educate public; rely on 
think tanks and science 
use their know-how to 
establish EU-projects in 
Estonia to sell green 
energy abroad 
mediate the views; support 
MKM; establish climate 
politics 2050 which builds 
on CO2 price; main idea is 
to produce fossil and 
renewable energy and 
increase efficiency, reduce 
emissions by taking 
advantage of research, 
satisfy the owner (state), i.e 
profit, valorise natural 
resources with less impact, 
ensure competitiveness; 
follow ENMAK; 
positioned itself as oil 
shale enterprise; find ways 
to transform different 
waste and sub products 
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development and 
innovation 
into valuables, substitution 
effects; long-term steps are 
determined by market and 
demand; no revolution, 
rather utilising existing 
capital;  
Perception 
about 
renewables  
RE not an objective in 
itself; good renewable 
sources in Estonia; 
renewable automatically 
refers to the term 
"subsidy".  
RE is the future; possibility 
to get rid of oil component 
in economy; transition 
needs real vision not a 
vision document; RE to be 
integrated into network to 
overcome any gaps 
asks for more distributed 
system; RE should be 
subsidised in order to 
increase the share in 
energy mix; possibility to 
mitigate risks; innovation 
takes place in the world; 
efficiency must be 
improved, e.g. to reduce 
the quantities of biomass 
needed 
 good wind conditions in 
Estonia is a business 
advantage; no fuel 
component is second 
market advantage; wind is 
the cheapest production 
method; renewables cannot 
currently be held 
accountable for 100% 
national RE objectives 
have to be met; RE 
requires innovation that is 
yet not available; RE seen 
take lions’ share of the 
energy mix; RE will be 
subsidised for 12 years 
since their establishment, 
only wind having limited 
to 600GW annually; 
Estonia seeks to meet the 
minimum possible targets 
for RE as planned by 
MKM. 
RE seen to have a lot of 
limitations. hydro, off-
shore wind not optional in 
Estonia; No accumulation 
technology; solar can be 
incorporated into a small 
heat-el system. Main RE is 
biomass; elsewhere in EU 
RE subsidised while new 
fossil based power plants 
are established behind the 
scene; 
Perception 
about the 
role of oil 
shale 
oil shale has potential; 
focus on oil production to 
improve efficiency and 
reduce GHG emissions; 
shale oil just like any other 
oil is a good export item;  
common good; has 
negative impacts on 
environment; socio-
economic problems related 
to oil shale worsen in time; 
industry will crash if no 
change; best use for oil 
shale would be chemical 
industry 
oil shale is responsible for 
80-90% of env problems; 
ideally alternative for using 
oil shale in chemical 
industry 
oil shale carries social 
responsibility in Ida-
Virumaa; the industry 
provides a lot of jobs 
making it irreplaceable;  
oil shale industry works to 
improve itself, show 
initiative; the socio-
economic crises has to be 
postponed in order to 
develop a strategy, market 
will dictate 
utilise as long as demand 
exist and as long as the 
state wishes; oil shale 
supports the establishment 
of RE; introduce new ways 
of utilising oil shale;  
 
